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Jagannath Panda, 
Research Fellow and 
Center Coordinator at 
the Manohar Parrikar 
InsƟtute for Defence 
Studies and Analyses, 
explains that “The 
rubric of Security and 
Growth for All in the 
Region advances India’s 
mariƟme diplomacy in 
the Indo‐Pacific, 
reflecƟng India’s desire 
to manage mariƟme 
security and 
governance in the 
Indian Ocean Region.” 
The concepts of ‘strategic autonomy’ and ‘inclusiveness’ have been core to India’s Indo‐Pacific policies. 
Without taking a defined posiƟon on the contested power poliƟcs in the Indo‐Pacific, India has largely 
maintained cordial relaƟons with most countries and stakeholders in the region. As a corollary to this, the 
rubric of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) advances India’s mariƟme diplomacy in the Indo
‐Pacific, reflecƟng India’s desire to manage mariƟme security and governance in the Indian Ocean Region 
(IOR). Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s proposiƟon to establish the Indo‐Pacific Ocean IniƟaƟve (IPOI) at the 
14th East Asia Summit (EAS) on November 4, 2019, primarily draws on this asserƟon.  
But what role could the IPOI play structurally in India’s Indo‐Pacific outlook? And importantly: does the 
iniƟaƟve hold any relevance in the post‐COVID‐19 order? As a pre‐Covid proposiƟon, the IPOI was aimed at 
promoƟng a ‘cooperaƟve’ and ‘consultaƟve’ strategic forum of engagement, which naturally ensured a 
greater role for India in the Indo‐Pacific. The proposal also affirmed its commitment to ‘Sustainable 
Development Goal 14’, in order to protect and secure the mariƟme domain, and advocated a ‘truly open, 
inclusive and cooperaƟve’ global order. Undoubtedly, in the post‐COVID era, the strategic imperaƟves for 
building such a ‘cooperaƟve’ and ‘consultaƟve’ framework assume greater significance than ever. 
The coronavirus outbreak has highlighted the flaws of over‐dependence of supply chains and economic 
networks on China – at present, large‐scale producƟon has been halted in almost all countries due to lack of 
resources, manpower and transportaƟon faciliƟes. The United NaƟons Conference on Trade and 
Development has already warned of a drop of 30‐40 per cent in foreign direct investments and a total 
esƟmated $2 trillion economic losses globally due to the pandemic. Such a scenario of global economic 
recession, amid compeƟng naƟonal interests, certainly emphasizes the need for a framework such as the 
IPOI to generate revenues and boost economies.  
With a prime focus on securing mariƟme boundaries, the IPOI stresses on seeking ‘partnerships’ that 
promote free trade and sustainable use of marine resources. It draws on three aspects of India’s Indo‐
Pacific outlook: purposive partnerships, a pluralisƟc policy and power promoƟon. A purposive partnership 
with ‘like‐minded’ countries is at the core of the IPOI. In Indian proposiƟon, such partnerships must have 
three common goals in the IOR (where China is fast emerging as a dominant power), namely wealth 
generaƟon, welfare promoƟon and (cooperaƟve) win‐win strategies – the three w’s. Put simply, the 
partners must cooperate in creaƟng wealth for developing Asian economies, as China is doing via the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank; promote welfare in the liƩoral states via a democraƟc model of 
governance; and win by creaƟng a rules‐based order that promotes free trade. The partnership involving 
the United States, Japan, Australia including India, under the rubrics of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 
(Quad), could be strengthened around such goals.  
The IPOI echoes India’s plurilateral approach of engagement.  It compliments Modi’s keynote address at the 
2018 Shangri La Dialogue, which underscored that India’s Indo‐Pacific approach was founded on ideas of 
‘pluralism, co‐existence, openness and dialogue’. Being a mulƟ‐stakeholder and cooperaƟve iniƟaƟve, the 
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IPOI focuses not only on ASEAN centrality, but also on Indo‐Pacific connecƟvity, sustainable infrastructure 
and economic cooperaƟon leading to regional integraƟon.  
Such a plurilateral approach becomes even more significance given the security concerns in the region, 
arising from both the tradiƟonal and non‐tradiƟonal security threats. The biggest and most pressing 
concern to the Indo‐Pacific and Asia has been the increasingly asserƟve military‐mariƟme posturing of 
China. Beijing’s plan is based on dominance in trade through its ambiƟous Belt and Road IniƟaƟve (BRI). 
However, in the post‐COVID period, China’s soŌ‐power promoƟon will surely take center stage; Beijing will 
make fresh aƩempts at rebuilding its relaƟons with countries that are criƟcal to the BRI. The focus will be 
on the IOR; the region is key to China’s ambiƟous MariƟme Silk Road iniƟaƟve with its thrust on creaƟng 
infrastructure for Chinese ships and mariƟme trade. Such Chinese unilateral iniƟaƟves must be held 
accountable; and a forum like IPOI could be the perfect strategic plaƞorm to review, scruƟnize and create 
awareness through debates and policy deliberaƟons.  
Much like the Indo‐Pacific strategies of the United States like the Infrastructure TransacƟon and Assistant 
Network and Blue Dot Network and Japan’s Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, the IPOI is a 
mulƟlateral regional iniƟaƟve for like‐minded naƟons. And if successfully implemented, it can address 
criƟcal issues of growth and development in the Indo‐Pacific, and parƟcularly forge a concentrated 
dialogue with the Indian Ocean Rim AssociaƟon (IORA), the only major mulƟlateral insƟtuƟon that exists in 
the IOR.  
For New Delhi, the IPOI assumes greater relevance for India to promote its power base ahead of the 
mounƟng Chinese presence in the IOR. New Delhi’s involvement in Quad 2.0; military engagement in 
bilateral, trilateral and mulƟlateral exercises like Australia‐India Exercise and Malabar; and signing of 
agreements like CommunicaƟons CompaƟbility and Security Agreement have enlarged India’s military‐
mariƟme posturing in the region. In addiƟon, naƟonal projects like Blue Economy IniƟaƟves and 
involvement in sub‐regional groupings like Indonesia‐Malaysia‐Thailand Growth Triangle and Ayeyawady‐
Chao Phraya‐Mekong Economic CooperaƟon Strategy strengthen India’s mariƟme economic resolves. 
Even though India withdrew from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, bilateral trade with 
countries like Japan, China, South Korea and Australia has been somewhat on the rise, or in any case have 
been steady. The IPOI, therefore, provides a basis for India to expand these networks across military and 
commercial domains, enabling its power promoƟon in the region.  
Arguing for a cooperaƟve system to advance the Oceans iniƟaƟve, New Delhi aims to promote a culture of 
insƟtuƟonal engagement in the IOR that would promote India’s power base and influence. India has been 
acƟvely engaged in the Indian Ocean Rim AssociaƟon (IORA), the most well‐known insƟtuƟonal insƟtuƟon 
in the IOR which has funcƟoned much in isolaƟon. The IPOI could establish greater structural linkages 
between IORA and other mulƟlateral groupings or iniƟaƟves such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission 
(IOTC), Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA), the Inter‐American Tropical Tuna 
Commission, Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, and Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries.  
Finally, with China’s emerging capability as a blue water navy, the contest to control the Sea Lanes of 
CommunicaƟon will conƟnue being a defining aspect of power contestaƟon. Non‐tradiƟonal security 
threats such as drug trafficking, piracy and climate change will make this contest more inƟmidaƟng. Thus, 
India’s emergence as an important Indo‐Pacific power is criƟcal for the United States and its alliances. And 
the IPOI is integral to that equaƟon.  
"For New Delhi, the 
IPOI assumes greater 
relevance for India to 
promote its power 
base ahead of the 
mounƟng Chinese 
presence in the IOR.”  
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